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Chapter 12 [revised- Dec. 2009] 
 
Late Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, and Their Aftermath 
 
David Ingram 
 
                                                            
 
Introduction 
 
 
Developments in Anglo-American philosophy during the first half of the 20th 
Century closely tracked developments that were occurring in continental philosophy 
during this period. This should not surprise us. Aside from the fertile communication 
between these ostensibly separate traditions, both were responding to problems 
associated with the rise of mass society. Rabid nationalism, corporate statism, and 
totalitarianism (Left and Right) posed a profound challenge to the idealistic rationalism of 
neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian philosophies. The decline of the individual – classically 
conceived by the 18th-century Enlightenment as a self-determining agent – provoked 
strong reactions. While some philosophical tendencies sought to re-conceive the 
relationship between individual, society, and nature in more organic ways that radically 
departed from the subjectivism associated with classical Cartesianism, other tendencies 
sought to do just the opposite.  This is one way of putting the difference between the two 
major movements within Anglo-American philosophy that I will be discussing in this 
essay.   
American pragmatism, which achieved the pinnacle of its popularity prior to 
1940, traces its lineage back to empiricism as well as German Idealism. With the 
exception of William James, who is best known for his defense of radical empiricism, the 
other two important 20th century pragmatists, John Dewey (1859–1952) and George 
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Herbert Mead (1863–1931), embraced a post-metaphysical version of Hegelian dialectics 
that was starkly antithetical to both Cartesian rationalism and atomistic empiricism. By 
contrast, logical positivism, which maintained a lively hold on Anglo-American thought 
as late as the sixties, reacted against Hegelian philosophy in all its forms, and accordingly 
resurrected both the Cartesian method of conceptual (logical) analysis as well as its 
atomistic ontology. 
 In this respect, positivism is closer in spirit to Husserlian phenomenology and 
French structuralism, while pragmatism is closer in spirit to Heideggerian existentialism 
and its French progeny (the outstanding exception being Sartre’s early Cartesian 
existentialism). As a general rule, the pragmatists’ embrace of methodological holism 
served as counterpoint to the positivists’ endorsement of methodological individualism. 
However, in contrast to their continental counterparts, pragmatists and positivists shared 
the naturalistic approach to philosophical explanation that had been the hallmark of 
Anglo-American philosophy since Bacon. 
 
 
Pragmatism 
 
In order to understand the complex relationship between Anglo-American 
philosophy and continental philosophy during the inter-War years, we would need to 
trace the genealogy of logical positivism and American pragmatism back to their late-
19th-century continental antecedents.  This dimension has been so thoroughly explored 
by others that little need be said here about this fascinating chapter in Western 
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philosophy.1  Aside from some notable exceptions – such as Husserl’s positive reaction to 
some of William James’s earlier ideas concerning experiential psychology (including 
Jame’s notion of an experiential “fringe,” which Husserl credits as a precursor to his own 
notion of “horizon”) -- the reception of American pragmatism by English, German, and 
French philosophy in the early decades of the 20th century was clouded by prejudicial 
misunderstanding that was partly abetted by the very philosopher who gave this 
movement its name. The German translation of William James’s Pragmatism: A New 
Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907) by Wilhelm Jerusalem in 1908 catapulted 
pragmatism into the central topic of discussion at the World Philosophical Congress held 
at Heidelberg that very same year. James’s assertion in that book that “the true … is only 
the expedient in the way of our thinking”2  – led many of his German contemporaries to 
dismiss this “new fad in philosophy … from the land of the dollar” as (in the words of 
one critic) a degradation of “the truth to the level of expediency, just as in days gone by, a 
similar way of thinking was imported to us from the land of shopkeepers [i.e., Britain] 
preaching the reduction of morality to utility.”3 The crassest misrepresentations of 
pragmatism spawned by this untimely reception have been the subject of a withering 
critique by Hans Joas. These include the view that pragmatism 
 
 reduces truth to utility; 
                                               
1
 See Joas, Pragmatism and Social Theory. 
2
 James, Pragmatism, p. 222. 
3
 Gutberlet, “Der Pragmatismus,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 21 (1908), pp. 437, 445, 
quoted in Joas, p. 98. 
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 endorses Cartesian subjectivism; and 
            represents a mishmash of Ernst Mach’s empirico-criticism, Friedrich 
 Nietzsche’s perspectivalism and will to power, and German Lebensphilosophie.4 
 
These misconceptions about pragmatism continued to inform German philosophy for the 
next four decades, as can be seen from Max Scheler’s and Horkheimer’s unsympathetic 
comments.5 Strikingly absent from this reception is any mention of the profound impact 
                                               
4
 Ibid., p. 99. 
5
 In his book Erkenntnis und Arbeit (1926), Scheler reduced pragmatism to a “knowledge 
of productivity,” which he distinguishes from a knowledge of culture 
(Bildungswissen) and a knowledge of redemption (Erlösungswissen). More tellingly, 
he equated this knowledge of productivity with a “knowledge of domination” that in 
his mind was largely indistinguishable from the kind of narrow instrumentalism that 
characterized positivism. Scheler’s interpretation of pragmatism served as the 
dominant reference point for Max Horkheimer’s dismissive treatment of Dewey’s 
philosophy in The Eclipse of Reason, written almost twenty years later. Although 
Horkheimer takes note of the “many schools of thought” that have criticized 
pragmatism, he himself cites only Hugo Münsterberg’s Philosophie der Werte and 
Scheler’s “Erkenntnis und Arbeit” in [Scheler’s] Wissenformen und die 
Gesellschaft” (Eclipse of Reason, p. 170).    
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of Charles Sanders Peirce on James’s thought.6 Indeed, Peirce’s signal contribution to the 
social philosophies of James’s most prominent successors in the pragmatist tradition 
(most notably Mead and Dewey) consists in his anti-Cartesian, anti-phenomenalist 
linkage of meaning and knowledge to action. More precisely, it was Peirce’s genetic 
linkage of instrumental action undertaken by a single intelligent being to social action 
undertaken by a community of knowers that would later inspire the progressive politics of 
Mead and Dewey. So central to the thought of Mead and Dewey (and, to a lesser extent 
Karl Popper) is this linkage of  reflective natural adaption and social community  that it 
would later ground their view that free and fully inclusive democracy is central to the full 
development of the kind of creative intelligence that is so necessary for progressive 
problem solving of any kind.      
 Peirce expressly derived his notion of “pragmaticism” from Kant’s use of 
pragmatisch in the Critique of Pure Reason (II, ch. 2, sec. 3) and the Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (Sec. II), where Kant equates it with instrumental (prudential) 
action guided by hypothetical (conditional) rules, in contrast with moral (practical) action 
guided by categorical (unconditional) imperatives. Peirce himself was mainly interested 
in showing how the meanings of many if not most general ideas (or signs) could be 
interpreted in terms of general (counterfactual) conditionals. Such conditionals prescribe 
the performance of an indefinite number of instrumental (experimental) actions that 
achieve definite consequences. Thus, the meaning of “this diamond is hard” would be 
                                               
6
 For further discussion of Peirce, see Douglas R. Anderson, “Peirce and Pragmatism:  
American ‘Schellingeanism,’” in History of Continental Philosophy. Volume 2:  The 
Revolutionary Age and/as Responses to Hegel, ed. Daniel W. Conway. 
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explicable by a statement of the sort “If one were to scratch, illuminate, etc., this 
substance, then consequences (such as failure to scratch, darken, etc.) would occur.” 
Especially important for later pragmatists is the way in which Peirce connects this 
account of meaning to an account of knowledge, truth, and logical probability. According 
to Pierce, the meanings of our words are constant because they signify fixed beliefs. 
These beliefs are acquired and confirmed in experimental situations in which the 
outcomes are at best statistically probable but not absolutely certain. Probability, in turn, 
designates a relative frequency, the average deviation from which diminishes in 
proportion to the number of trials. The upshot is that the constancy of a sign’s meaning is 
also relative to experimentally confirmed statistical frequencies produced over time. 
Indeed, so is truth. For on Peirce’s account, it is the experimental method – not tenacity, 
authority, or a priori reasoning – that enables us to approximate a lasting consensus in 
the fixation of belief and thereby eliminate deviations that produce doubt. More 
importantly, it is the experimental method as applied by an indefinite ideal community of 
inquirers that gradually enables us to approximate (if not reach) a true and lasting 
consensus over time regarding all of our beliefs, moral as well as cognitive. 
Peirce’s insights regarding knowledge and meaning proved seminal for Dewey 
and Mead. Dewey began his career as a Hegelian. During the period from 1890 to 1900, 
his embrace of Hegelian idealism, with its notion of conceptual holism and conceptual 
dialectic (or development) traversing stages of contradiction (analytic opposition and 
distinction) and resolution (synthetic unification and identification), underwent a 
profound naturalistic transformation. Under the influence of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution, Dewey translated this dialectic into the idiom of biological organism and 
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growth as a progressive process of environmental adaptation and change. His deeper 
exposure to Peirce’s and James’s pragmatism around the turn of the century added a third 
element to this equation: instrumentalism (or “experimental idealism” as he then 
formulated it).  As we shall see, Dewey’s instrumentalism bears a striking resemblance to 
certain aspects of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology in its emphasis on the holistic 
and situational nature of human understanding (or inquiry, as Dewey dubbed it). For 
Dewey, human understanding involves an embodied attunement to an environment that is 
already meaningful (circumscribed by language and community) but never determinately 
so, thereby calling forth an on-going process of active interpretation (reconstruction) in 
light of new questions, new problems, and new possibilities.  
While Dewey was interested in working out the implications of instrumentalism 
for a theory of democracy and education, Mead was chiefly preoccupied with applying 
Peirce’s anti-Cartesian insights about the communal genesis of knowledge and meaning 
to the new fields of developmental and social psychology.  As with Dewey’s pragmatism, 
Mead’s symbolic interactionism, which he also called social behaviorism, owes a great 
deal to Hegel’s dialectical philosophy, especially its account of self-certainty, conceived 
as a process of acquiring recognition from (internalizing the viewpoint of) another.  For 
Mead, one becomes a full self – an “I” who as subject can reflectively relate to itself as 
object, or “me” – only in the course of proceeding through progressive stages of social 
and symbolic interaction. As socialization proceeds, so does individuation. Ultimately, 
the capacity of the self to internalize the impersonal and abstract role of language itself – 
signified by the human community (or generalized other) – enables the self to critically 
free itself from the particular social roles constitutive of itself as a nexus of social habits 
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(or “me”), thereby enabling it to become a uniquely creative inventor of its own values 
and beliefs – in short, of its own identity as an “I.” 
 
 
George Herbert Mead7 
 
Mead’s entire career was informed by the Hegelian insight that “the whole is 
more concrete than the part.”8 The rather meager corpus of essays and fragments that 
constitute Mead’s oeuvre, most of which have been posthumously published in various 
collections, repeatedly attest to the power this idea had on his thought. Once again, it is 
Peirce’s notion of a community of interpretation as pivotal for understanding meaning 
and belief that links this idealistic notion to an account of social behavior. Darwin’s 
                                               
7
 Mead was born in South Hadley, Massachusetts, on February 27, 1863 and died in 
Chicago in April 26, 1931. He received his BA from Oberlin College (1879–83) and 
began doing graduate work at Harvard in 1887, although he never wrote a 
dissertation.  In 1893 he was appointed professor of philosophy at the University of 
Chicago, where he served in that capacity until his death. His main intellectual 
influences were Adam Smith, Hegel, and Darwin. Among his most important books 
are The Philosophy of the Present (1932), ed. Arthur E. Murphy; Mind, Self, and 
Society (1934), ed. Charles W. Morris; Philosophy of the Act (1938), ed. Charles W. 
Morris; Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead (1964); and The Individual and the 
Social World: Unpublished Work of George Herbert Mead  (1982).  
8
 Mead, Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead, p. 166. 
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Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals provided Mead with an evolutionary 
model for understanding the rudimentary social psychology of animal behavior. 
Meanwhile, Dewey’s important work on the reflex (stimulus response) arc, which in 
many ways anticipated Gestalt psychology as well as the phenomenology of perception 
and behavior developed by Merleau-Ponty a half century later, provided him with a non-
atomistic (non-mechanistic) model of organic behavior, understood as an interpretative 
response that internalizes and reconstitutes a stimulus within a learning arc.9 
 Mead is chiefly concerned to show how mind and self emerge in the course of 
traversing logical phases in the development of social and symbolic interaction. The most 
primitive phase – “the conversation of gestures” – can be observed in animals, as when a 
dog growls in order to ward off another dog. Darwin regarded such gestures as 
expressions of inner emotional states, not as forms of social interaction. For Mead, the 
gesture possesses significance for the dog toward whom the gesture is directed. The 
gesture’s capacity to stimulate behavior causally depends on its being significant to its 
recipient. As with Dewey, the stimulus only becomes effective by being constituted and 
interpreted as significant. Here, however, the significance in question is established 
socially, as a type or pattern of response (coordination) that comes to be shared. 
So construed, there need not be anything like a “consciousness of meaning” on 
the part of the dogs in question regarding the significance of their growling. Meaning and 
language first emerge when the gesture becomes  a “significant symbol.” That happens 
                                               
9
 Dewey’s “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” was published in the journal 
Psychological Review in 1896. In 1942 a committee of seventy psychologists named 
it the most significant contribution ever published in the journal.   
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when the dogs learn how to use their growling gestures purposefully. The gesture of 
growling becomes mutually meaningful once each dog “internalizes” the fact that 
growling calls forth a specific behavior in the other dog. In order for this to happen, each 
dog must take the attitude of the other dog toward his own behavior. That is, as a dog I 
imagine myself being the other dog.10 In imagining myself thus, I learn to respond to my 
own act, to reflect on myself.  
Mead’s fascinating account of infantile role-playing connects the interactive 
genesis of meaning with the social, moral, and cognitive development of the self. In play 
a child imagines herself playing the roles of her parents or other significant others.  She 
conducts a conversation with herself, playing different roles, the meaning of which she 
herself more or less freely constitutes (albeit, with the guidance of some incipient 
models). When play becomes a game involving other children, the child has less freedom 
to improvise, for here the roles have to be negotiated and agreed upon. In order to do this, 
the child has to learn to take up the attitude of all her playmates. The game of tag, for 
example, only works if the child who is “it” simultaneously adopts the attitude of all the 
other players (in effect, playing out their assumed roles in the interiority of her mind). 
                                               
10
 Mead’s reference to the act of seeing oneself through the eyes of the other not only 
paraphrases Hegel’s famous account of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology 
but it recalls Adam Smith’s belief that in moral matters “[w]e suppose ourselves 
spectators of our own behavior, and endeavor to imagine what effect [our own 
passions and conduct] would, in this light [i.e., regards our feelings of approval or 
censure] produce upon us” (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 112).  
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It is this reflexive role-playing and attitude-taking competence that founds the 
ability to participate in all other social groups, from the most local of neighborhood clubs 
to the most all-inclusive humanity. In becoming social, the child learns to adopt the 
standpoint of the generalized other. Ultimately, it is by internalizing the attitude of the 
community in which she belongs that she internalizes the moral responses of that 
community and becomes a “principled” person. But the self does not lose its individuality 
in becoming so socialized. On the contrary, the capacity to adopt an abstract point of 
view (that of the community or of humanity at large) enables one to critically objectify 
and freely distance oneself from the multitude of particular roles one has internalized as 
“me.” 
 Individuals, then, are the outcome of freely reconstituting and reinterpreting the 
various habituated social roles within their repertory. Qua “me,” the individual is a 
unique (and in that sense individual) confluence of sedimented social roles that one can 
recall to memory (as a part of one’s already scripted autobiography). However, once 
recalled to memory and made an object to oneself through adopting the attitude of a 
second-person, the “me” can be set in dialogue with a more abstract aspect of the self, 
which is formed by taking the role of a third-person observer – the generalized other 
(representing the attitude of the social group taken as a whole). 
 In contrast to the “me,” which is the unconscious repository of social norms, the 
“I” represents that part of the self who reacts almost impulsively against (or towards) the 
attitude of the community and tries to change it. Unlike the “me,” the “I” cannot be 
reflectively known as an object from the perspective of the second-person. Instead, as a 
kind of instinctual or imaginative spontaneity, it deploys the critical admonitions of the 
12 
 
conventional generalized other (the superego, in Freudian parlance) and projects these 
onto the image of an ideal, utopian community in which the “I” along with all other “I”s 
achieves perfect freedom and fulfillment. So construed, the “I” is the source of two kinds 
of moral demands: a demand for moral autonomy, which finds expression in the 
individual’s assertion of its rights against the conventional norms and laws of the 
community, and a demand for self-realization. 
In sum, the self is a dialectical movement, in that it becomes increasingly free and 
individuated only to the extent that it expands the circle of recognition from the second-
person to the third-person, and from the conventional third-person to the ideal (universal) 
third person. In this respect, individuation and socialization mutually condition one 
another through the inextricable identity linking social dependency and individual 
autonomy.  Society and individual realize one another.  
 
 
John Dewey11 
                                               
11
 Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont on October 20, 1859, and died in New York 
City on June 1, 1952. He received his BA from the University of Vermont (1875–79) 
and received his PhD from Johns Hopkins University in 1884. He was appointed 
professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan until 1894, when he accepted 
an appointment at the University of Chicago. He finished his career at Columbia 
University in New York City (1905-1939). Charles Peirce (whose lectures on logic 
he attended while at Johns Hopkins) and the neo-Hegelian idealism of George 
Sylvester Morris were early influences during his graduate studies. Later influences  
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Although logic and epistemology form the core of Dewey’s pragmatism, they 
acquire a distinctive social and political significance in his writings that recall Mead’s 
analysis of the ideal trajectory of socialization and individuation,  embeddedness and 
emancipation. For Dewey, inquiry necessarily involves a process of critical evaluation 
that engages all aspects of our social being. As with Peirce, experimental inquiry is a 
communal activity whose full potential is only realized in democracy, understood as a 
critical, egalitarian communication of the experimental inputs of each and every member 
of the community. So construed, community and democracy primarily function as social 
instruments for problem solving.  
A brief glance at some of Dewey’s major works – Logic: The Theory of Inquiry 
(1938), Art as Experience (1934), Democracy and Education (1916), Experience and 
Nature (1925) – confirms this assessment. What Dewey means by logic is a general 
theory about the rules governing the formation of concepts, judgments, and inferences in 
experimental situations; it is a complete theory of human thought and reasoning 
conceived in instrumental terms. From an evolutionary point of view, instrumental 
activity is the means by which humans adapt to and change their environment (and 
thereby change themselves). Phenomenologically speaking, humans are not just spatially 
inserted into the world as if they were things. Rather, they constitute the world they 
inhabit; that is, their interests and concerns provide selective reference points for 
interpreting their surrounding situation as a contextual, meaningful whole. Inquiry is 
                                                                                                                                            
included William James and his colleague at the University of Chicago, George 
Herbert Mead.   
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initiated when the situation no longer presents itself as a determinate and coherent whole. 
 Biologically speaking, the human organism experiences a disruption of adaptive 
functioning, a disequilibrium with respect to its environment as well as with respect to 
itself. Re-establishing harmony requires reconstituting the situation (and therewith 
oneself and one’s experience) in a logical succession of developmental stages. Stage one 
involves reinterpretation (thoughtful redescription) of a problematic situation that 
determines what might or not be relevant; stage two consists in formulating solutions to 
the problematic situation that take the form of instrumental hypotheses; stage three 
concretizes (further determines and delimits) the range of possible solutions by sifting 
through factual observations that in turn suggest new “ideas” or ways of resolving the 
problem; stage four deploys “reasoning” to articulate and define ideas in relationship to 
one another by means of propositions and inferences; and the fifth and final stage 
culminates in an experimental testing of the ideas so developed. If they prove successful, 
then we are warranted in asserting them as “true” judgments just so long as they continue 
to effect an operationally successful (existential) correspondence between the questions 
posed by the situation and the answers posed by the inquirer. 
The nature of inquiry not only incorporates critical evaluation of what, in a 
problematic situation, is important to us – relative to our needs, desires, feelings, and 
interests – but it provides a mechanism for reconstituting these very concerns. In other 
words, inquiry constitutes the very contents of our moral life, and it constitutes them 
within a continuous process of education and growth. The reference to growth has 
teleological import: indeed, for Dewey, “growth itself is the only moral ‘end’.”12  The 
                                               
12
 Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 177. 
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proper aim of education is thus to facilitate growth, by enabling the formation of 
intelligent habits of thought and behavior. These, in turn, are teleologically directed 
toward the resolution of conflicts – social as well as natural. While complete integration 
with one’s environment is never achievable, it does point to the importance of joining 
with others in peaceful democratic community in furthering the social and political 
conditions that conduce to mutual growth. Social and political arrangements that are 
premised on a false individualism (or false totalitarianism) violate these conditions; as do 
any arrangements that generate social inequalities and conflicts  
(or authoritarian solidarities). 
 Dewey’s own faith in a new liberalism reconstructed along the lines of a 
democratic and scientific socialism recalls Mead’s discussion of the “emancipatory” 
trajectory of genuine socialization . In many respects, Dewey’s liberalism – as developed 
in Liberalism and Social Action (1935) and Individualism: Old and New (1929) – harks 
back to John Stuart Mill’s appeal to Humboldt’s romantic paean to “individuality,” which 
in turn recalls the Feuerbachian Hegelianism of the young Marx that proved so 
compelling to members of the Frankfurt School of critical theory.  Central to this 
understanding is a belief that traditional liberalism and theoretical science are caught up 
in a “dialectic of enlightenment,” to use Adorno and Horkheimer’s expression. According 
to Dewey, the classical liberalism of Locke emancipated the individual from absolutist 
forms of government, but only at the expense of dissolving the individual into an 
“atomistic” ego, whose liberty was seen as an innate endowment cut off from society. 
Such atomistic individualism informed the second, utilitarian wave of 19th-century 
liberalism where, following Bentham’s teachings (adopted from Adam Smith), it 
16 
 
entrenched itself in the form of laissez-faire economic liberalism. The result, correctly 
diagnosed by Marx, was a contradiction between a socially and scientifically organized 
form of industrial capitalism, on one side, and an individualistic legal conception of 
private property, on the other. Here, the individual is but an alienated, fragmented, and 
truncated self – a mere cog in a capitalist machine that operates according to an equally 
one-sided (socially detached and anarchic) instrumental rationality, dominated by 
scientific, technological, and managerial specialists who have no connection with the 
“social whole.”  
 In Dewey’s opinion, the emergence of a new corporate (industrial) capitalism 
signals a crisis of liberalism, in which the full flowering of liberalism’s own ideals of 
freedom, individualism, and reason run up against a new form of economic, political, and 
social domination. Exit from this crisis will come neither from piecemeal reform nor 
violent revolution. Salvation, for Dewey, will rather come from harnessing the older 
method of democratic discussion to the newer method of scientific experimentation, now 
conceived as an all-inclusive activity of social intelligence. Properly conceived, social 
science does not merely discover and apply timeless social laws for purposes of 
prediction and control, but clarifies concrete social problems with the aim of critically 
evaluating and altering existing social patterns. Its criticism of social ideologies (old 
habits and prejudices) serves to raise social consciousness and enlighten transformative 
democratic practice.  Reconstructed as a radical social(ist) democracy, the new, 
scientifically enlightened liberalism will critically integrate and reconstitute the material 
needs of producers and consumers in the direction of fulfilling higher-order social and 
spiritual needs.                        
17 
 
       
 
Positivism 
 
Given Rudolf Carnap’s dismissal of Heidegger’s philosophy and Bertrand 
Russell’s negative caricature of German philosophy in general (not to mention his sharp 
criticism of James’s philosophy), we might be forgiven the all too easy temptation to 
oppose logical positivism and analytic philosophy to pragmatism.13 Yet, despite the fact 
that positivism and pragmatism have somewhat different pedigrees (British empiricism 
versus German Idealism), methods (individualism versus holism), and projects (analyzing 
abstract concepts with universal scope versus interpreting concepts against the 
background of concrete historical practices,  establishing the indubitable certainty/truth of 
beliefs versus describing their  social and historical genesis), their respective practitioners 
share much in common. Both embrace some form of naturalism; preferring scientific and 
logical approaches, they disdain the use of transcendental methods of philosophical 
introspection that proved so indispensable to their continental counterparts. They also 
incline towards experimentalist accounts of meaning and knowledge. Given this 
convergence, we should not be surprised that positivist and post-positivist thinkers such 
as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Karl Popper, Wilfred Sellars, Nelson Goodman, and W. V. O. 
                                               
13
 For a discussion of the Carnap-Heidegger relation, see Michael Friedman and Thomas 
Ryckman, “Analytic and Continental Traditions:  Frege, Husserl, Carnap, and 
Heidegger,” in History of Continental Philosophy. Volume 3:  The New Century, ed. 
Keith Ansell Pearson and Alan D. Schrift. 
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Quine characterized themselves (or were characterized by others, such as American 
pragmatist Charles W. Morris) as pragmatists. Indeed, Dewey himself co-edited a book 
with several noted logical positivists and even contributed an article to that volume;14 and 
as they migrated to the United States, logical positivists tried to enlist Dewey’s 
philosophy in their own cause. 
Logical positivism is an expression coined by Herbert Feigl and A. E. Blumberg 
in 1931 to describe the ideas of the Vienna Circle, whose most important associates –
including  Carnap, Feigl, Otto Neurath, Hans Reichenbach, and Gustav Bergmann – later 
immigrated to England (where they were sympathetically received by the reigning 
analytic philosophy made popular by Wittgenstein, Russell, and A.J. Ayer) and the 
United States (where they transformed or undermined the prevailing pragmatist ethos). 
Logical positivists were strongly motivated by a quest for logical clarity and epistemic 
certainty. These logical and empirical concerns were brought together under a single 
program – the so-called “verificationist” theory of meaning that had been advanced by 
Wittgenstein in his Tractatus (1921). Wittgenstein intended his theory as a criticism of 
any philosophy that deviates from the narrow logical task of “showing” how our 
language means, or “pictures” a world of “atomic facts,” but its immediate effect was to 
consign all non-factual propositions  (propositions whose truth or falsity could not in 
principle be verifiable by observation) as “meaningless.” The results were deeply 
disturbing and paradoxical: not only were the evaluative and expressive statements of 
ethics, religion, metaphysics, and aesthetics suddenly consigned to practical irrelevance, 
                                               
14
 See Dewey, “Unity of Science as a Social Problem,” in Neurath, Carnap, Dewey, et al., 
Encyclopedia and Unified Science. 
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but (as Wittgenstein ironically noted) so were the propositions of philosophy that asserted 
the verificationist theory of meaning. Indeed, the specter of Hume’s skepticism regarding 
induction that the school had sought to exorcise reappeared with a vengeance once it 
became clear that the general law-like propositions of science whose truth, as pragmatists 
had taught, could never be fully verified, were equally meaningless on this account.  
 Despite the challenges that verificationism posed to philosophy and science (see 
below), logical positivists believed that the nomological method of causal explanation 
and the inductive method of causal discovery were, taken together, the only methods for 
grounding knowledge and meaning. Consequently, they subscribed to a reductive, unified 
view of knowledge that sharply contrasted with the logical distinction between natural 
and human sciences that neo-Kantians such as Dilthey had popularized a generation 
earlier. In short, positivists maintained that the historical, sociological, and psychological 
sciences must not deviate from the experimental and nomological (or “covering law”) 
methods of causal explanation exemplified by the natural sciences on pain of being 
rendered totally “unscientific” and meaningless. 
Verificationism and reductionism – the two shibboleths of logical positivism – 
would eventually come under attack from philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, Popper, 
Sellars,15 Goodman,16 and Quine17 – who had considered themselves to be sympathetic to 
                                               
15
 Wilfrid Sellars (1912–89) firmly rejected epistemological foundationalism. One of the 
first philosophers to integrate Anglo-American analytic philosophy and Austro-
German logical positivism with American pragmatism and Hegelian thought, he 
devoted much of his life to reconciling the naturalist, “scientific image” of reality 
with the commonsense (or “manifest”) image of the same held by average persons. 
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Key to this attempt, however, was his non-reductive distinction between the 
(naturalistic) space of experiential genesis via causal processes and (linguistic or 
propositional) space of belief formation and reasoned justification. Today he is 
considered by many to be the founder of inferential semantics, whose leading 
contemporary torchbearer is his former student, Robert Brandom, who is also a self-
described Hegelian pragmatist. Among Sellars’s most important papers are 
“Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956) and “Philosophy and the Scientific 
Image of Man” (1962). 
16
 Nelson Goodman (1906–98) made significant contributions to mathematic logic, the 
theory of induction, and aesthetics.   Goodman  believed that a nominalistic calculus 
of individuals should be the starting point for reconstructing mathematical logic 
(which he and Quine held, following American pragmatist premises, could not be 
distinguished in principle from empirical science) rather than set theory (this is the 
basis for Goodman’s variant of “mereology.” He also held, against Hempel, that 
causal (law-like) generalizations could not be distinguished from accidental 
generalizations (thereby re-formulating the Humean problem of induction), at least 
in everyday contexts in which the use of predicates is not sharply fixed by formal 
stipulation. Goodman’s hypothetical example of “grue,” which applies to all green 
things examined before a certain time t and to all blue things examined after t, shows 
that an apparent law-like generalization “Emeralds are green” would confirm 
(according to the generalization that “all green things are grue”) the generalization 
that “Emeralds are blue” after t, thereby showing that anything can confirm anything 
depending on our accidental methods of classifying types. Finally, Goodman’s most 
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some aspects of the positivist cause. Carnap and Neurath had argued (against Moritz 
Schlick) that scientific laws were not merely inferential rules connecting singular factual 
statements but were themselves factual claims subject to potential verification or 
falsification. But how? Were such generalizations verified (falsified) by experience, as 
many positivists thought?  As Neurath (followed by Sellars and Quine) pointed out, only 
a proposition can verify (justify) a proposition. Were such generalizations then 
translatable as sets of first-person observation statements (protocol statements), as Carnap 
suggested? If these statements were formulated as dated observations of physical objects, 
such as tables and rooms, then such reports would be an unreliable basis for confirmation 
or falsification, since it might be doubted whether these observations were veridical. On 
the other hand, if they were formulated as dated observations of private sensory 
                                                                                                                                            
famous work – in the area of aesthetics – showed how art and the aesthetic could be 
understood as creating new ontological worlds (or vocabularies for perceiving and 
describing reality) in a way that converged with Heidegger’s own views about the 
ontological import of the work of art. Goodman’s most important student at Harvard 
was the neo-pragmatist Hilary Putnam. Among his most famous works are The 
Structure of Appearance (1951), Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1955), and Ways of 
Worldmaking (1978).  
17
 Norman Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) is most famous for attacking the analytic-
synthetic distinction and with it, the verificationist theory of meaning, the two pillars 
of logical positivism (see below). His most important books include From a Logical 
Point of View (1953), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1969), and The Ways 
of Paradox and Other Essays (1976).  
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experiences (“here, now, blue” as Schlick insisted), then their subjective certainty would 
be purchased at the cost of their un-translatability into objective statements. 
 
Post-Positivism  
 
For post-positivists such as Quine and Popper, the paradoxes surrounding 
verificationism were best resolved by jettisoning the theory. Like the pragmatists, they 
argued that scientific generalizations are not constructed out of particular experiences 
(induction) but are experimental hypotheses formulated by prior theories, which are 
themselves the products of imagination. Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic 
distinction in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) was especially effective in 
undermining the positivist distinction between necessary (analytic or identity) statements 
concerning logical meaning and contingent (synthetic or empirically informative) 
statements concerning experience and behavior – a distinction Dewey himself had 
vigorously criticized many years earlier in his 1938 Logic, when he observed that 
“[w]hen a linguistic form is separated from the contextual matter of problem inquiry it is 
impossible to decide of what logical form it is the expression.” Accordingly, the dogma 
of a theory- (concept- or meaning-) independent experience that could stand as an 
independent standard for constructing and testing a theory was laid to rest. 
 
Karl Popper 
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For his part, Popper held that induction could not confirm scientific hypotheses 
because (as Peirce had seen) they refer to an indefinite number of counterfactual tests. 
The “necessary connection” that distinguishes causal relations from non-necessary but 
relatively invariant correlations of past events – the problem of induction diagnosed by 
Hume – can only be articulated when such hypotheses are formulated as counterfactual 
conditionals of the form: “Had y not happened, z would not have happened.” Because 
scientific hypotheses are counterfactual, they cannot be definitively verified by past and 
present experiences (events) but can only be falsified with reference to present and future 
experiences. Hence, for Popper, the true test for the meaningfulness of a scientific theory 
is its capacity to generate potentially falsifiable hypotheses. But this attempt to save 
positivism – by replacing verification with falsification – also fails, since as Quine later 
argued (and Popper himself conceded), disconfirming tests do not suffice to falsify a 
given hypothesis so much as place in doubt a system of interconnected supporting 
hypotheses. Which hypothesis we choose to eliminate in order to restore coherence is 
thus not determined exclusively by our observations. Our epistemic commitments – for 
instance, how central a hypothesis is within the web of our otherwise workable belief 
system – also play a role. This pragmatic insight would later inspire Thomas Kuhn’s 
conception of scientific revolutions,18 in which changes in scientific paradigm are 
stimulated by anomalous test results only when a potentially more fruitful (if inarticulate 
and as of yet unconfirmed) paradigm has gained support from the majority of a scientific 
community. 
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 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
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Popper’s criticism of verificationism did not extend to positivism’s other defining 
postulates: unificationism and fact-value dualism. Along with Carl Hempel, he insisted 
that the historical and social sciences yield meaningful hypotheses only insofar as their 
explanation of events and actions are capable of being framed in terms of general (or 
statistical) laws of behavior. Such causal explanations could be useful to the formation of 
public policies aimed at piecemeal social reform. In contrast with these hypothetical 
technical predictions, the grandiose revolutionary experiments undertaken by such 
totalitarian movements as fascism and communism are not guided by scientific 
knowledge, despite contrary claims offered by their proponents. 
  Popper’s two-volume magnum opus The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), 
and his shorter treatise The Poverty of Historicism (1957), link this narrow scientific 
claim to a broader conception of morality, action, and politics in a manner that merits 
closer scrutiny. To begin with, Popper argues that the laws of historical development and 
social evolution that defenders of total revolution advocate – what he referred to as 
“historicism” – are ultimately meaningless, since they do not yield falsifiable 
hypotheses.19 Such laws as inform Marx’s historical materialism, which ostensibly 
postulates an inevitable progression of social formations (modes of production) 
culminating in communism, Plato’s views about the inevitable decline of well-ordered 
polities into tyranny, or fascist doctrines about the fateful struggle and victory of master 
                                               
19
  Popper’s notion of historicism must not be confused with the concept of historicism 
that was used by Husserl, Dilthey, and other (mainly neo-Kantian) thinkers at the 
turn of the century, for whom the term referred to a kind of historical relativity in the 
understanding of distinctive historical epochs and cultural worldviews.   
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races are all examples of unscientific (and irrational) ideologies.  The architects who use 
such ideologies to construct their revolutionary societies cannot allow any actions that 
deviate from the predicted outcome, so they insist on totalitarian controls that transform 
modern societies that are otherwise open, liberal, and democratic (or on the cusp of 
becoming so) into societies that are primitive, closed, and tribal.  
According to Popper, the critical rationalism inherent within science demands an 
open society. Persons must be free to imagine new hypotheses; ultimately, the values 
(moral and non-moral) that guide the inventive formulation of hypotheses are themselves 
the outcome of existential decisions that are entirely unpredictable. The fact that the 
consequences and meanings of actions transcend the intentions of actors and that the 
latter are themselves critically generated and revised within the context of multi-vocal 
and open-ended conversations means that the predictions of predetermined outcomes 
made by revolutionary social engineers must come to naught. As another contemporary 
Kantian, Hannah Arendt, astutely noted in her criticism of totalitarianism, the 
revolutionary spirit underlying utopian moral idealism inevitably shatters against the hard 
fact of moral freedom.    
 
The Contemporary Influence of American Pragmatism and Logical Positivism  
        
As I noted earlier, once logical positivism became transplanted onto American 
soil by German and Austrian émigrés fleeing Nazi Germany it was vigorously promoted 
as a more analytically rigorous – and ostensibly superior – way of doing philosophy than 
its pragmatist counterpart. Hence the virtual disappearance of pragmatism in major PhD-
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granting philosophy departments during the fifties and sixties. There is also some 
anecdotal evidence, assembled by John McCumber, that political motivations may also 
have contributed to this change.20  Although positivists like Carnap and Neurath had left-
wing sympathies, their philosophy had the distinct merit of being untainted by the left-
leaning, social progressivism that marked Mead’s and Dewey’s pragmatism. Limiting 
philosophy to the singular task of conceptual clarification and epistemological 
foundationalism, logical positivists eschewed normative ethics altogether in favor of 
meta-ethical ruminations on the meaning of “ought,” “good,” and the like. As a 
worldview that promoted skepticism of any holistic or global historical (or totalizing) 
understanding of social and economic structures, even Popper’s critical rationalism could 
at best promote piecemeal reform of a system that was largely taken for granted.  
During the McCarthy Era, Popper’s relatively weak vision of an open society of 
free inquirers was not to be found among American philosophy departments. Yet despite 
the near total eclipse of pragmatism, post-positivist tendencies that drew from (or 
otherwise replicated) ideas developed by pragmatist philosophers gradually supplanted 
positivist shibboleths. The Anglo-American world was thus well-prepared for the 
renaissance of neo-pragmatist thought that was ushered in by Richard Rorty’s Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature in 1979 and alternatively taken up by such notable philosophers 
as Hilary Putnam and (more recently), John McDowell and Robert Brandom.21 
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 McCumber, Time in a Ditch. 
21
 These developments are discussed in several essays in the following volumes; see 
David R. Hiley, “Rorty among the Continentals,” in History of Continental 
Philosophy. Volume 6: Poststructuralism and Critical, ed. Alan D. Schrift; José 
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  Oddly, despite the affinities between pragmatism and continental philosophy – 
notably Heideggerian phenomenology and Frankfurt-School neo-Marxism – there was 
virtually no productive interchange between these currents of thought until the seventies. 
I mentioned the utter failure of Max Horkheimer and other first-generation critical 
theorists to read the works of Dewey seriously.22 Therefore, in concluding this essay, I 
                                                                                                                                            
Medina, “The Performative Turn and the Emergence of Post-Analytic Philosophy,” 
in History of Continental Philosophy. Volume 7:  Post-Poststructuralism, ed. Rosi 
Braidotti; and John Fennell, “Re-Thinking Anglo-American Philosophy: The Neo-
Kantianism of Davidson, McDowell, and Brandom,” in History of Continental 
Philosophy. Volume 8: Emerging Trends in Continental Philosophy, ed. Todd May. 
22
 Dewey is the philosopher most often mentioned by Horkheimer in The Eclipse of 
Reason. Yet James Schmidt points out that Horkheimer’s discussion of Dewey and 
pragmatism in the second of the Columbia University Lectures he gave in 1944 that 
would later form the core of his book was an afterthought. Indeed, Horkheimer was 
only prompted to correct the interpretation of pragmatism contained in the lecture 
when he wrote his manuscript, which was critically reviewed by C. Wright Mills, 
who believed that  Horkheimer had grasped  pragmatism “in a rather vulgar form” 
and without apparent familiarity with the primary texts. Although Horkheimer told 
Leo Lıwenthal that he felt he had become “an expert” on American pragmatism, 
having read “not a few of these native products,” his belief that pragmatism and 
positivism were virtually indistinguishable, save for the latter’s “phenomenalism” 
(“sensualistic idealism”), belies this judgment.  In Horkheimer’s opinion, 
pragmatism, no less than positivism, identifies philosophy with scientism, which by 
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would like to recall how the Frankfurt School’s own struggle with positivism led it to 
eventually recover the legacy of American pragmatism well before it became fashionable 
in the English-speaking world. 
The positivist postulates of scientific unificationism and fact-value dualism were 
strenuously resisted by philosophers influenced by the linguistic philosophy of the late 
Wittgenstein and, on the continent, by critical theorists. Critical theorists such as Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer saw positivism (including Popper’s critical rationalism) as 
fundamentally uncritical and reactionary. The positivist dismissal of evaluative language, 
its insistence on defining truth and meaning in terms of correspondence with atomic facts 
or subjectively given sense experiences – in total abstraction from the broader historical, 
economic, political, and socio-cultural context conditioning perception, thought, and 
language – struck them as a false and ideological affirmation of the status quo. While 
they did not deny the epistemic value of predictive and technically useful knowledge 
within the behavioral sciences, critical theorists regarded such knowledge as but a 
subordinate aspect within social science taken as a whole, the proper aim of which, they 
maintained, was not instrumental prediction and control of human behavior but the 
critique of “naturalizing” ideologies that depict society as a realm of rigid, unchanging 
laws. 
                                                                                                                                            
its very nature is subjectivistic in that “true judgments on objects, and therewith the 
concept of the object itself, rests solely on ‘effects’ upon the subject’s action” 
(Eclipse of Reason, p. 45). See Schmidt, “The Eclipse of Reason and the End of the 
Frankfurt School in America.”  
29 
 
The so-called “positivist dispute” of the early sixties that pitted Popper and his 
followers against Adorno and his former assistant, Jürgen Habermas, brought the issue of 
“critical social knowledge” into stark relief. Popperians defended a unified scientific 
method as the only empirically responsible approach to social critique and impugned the 
holistic hermeneutical methods of critical theorists as an uncritical recrudescence of 
Hegelian dialectical metaphysics. Critical theorists responded that social scientists could 
not causally explain human behavior without first interpreting it as meaningful and norm-
governed in a way that referred to interests, ideas, and utopian ideals that simultaneously 
corresponded to and conflicted with the laws of capitalist accumulation. Furthermore, 
they bridled at the fact/value distinction upheld by the Popperians, which consigned 
critical evaluations to the irrational status of existential decisions. This was a 
“decisionism,” they believed, that could all too easily degenerate into a resolute 
acquiescence to the powers that be, as exemplified by the illustrative fate of Carl Schmitt 
and Martin Heidegger.  
 Habermas enlisted none other than Wittgenstein himself in arguing against the 
unified science postulate maintained by the Popperians.  Wittgenstein’s late philosophy 
of language, the most mature of expression of which is expounded in his posthumous 
work, Philosophical Investigations (1953), develops a pragmatist account of meaning that 
is completely antithetical to the positivist view he had earlier developed in the 
Tractatus.23  In the mature work, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of language is 
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 For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s turn against his own earlier views in the Tractatus, 
see the essay by Bob Plant and John Fennell in History of Continental Philosophy. 
Volume 3, ed. Ansell Pearson and Schrift. 
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holistic and contextual (syncategorematic) and linked to observable use rather than to 
ostensive reference.  Language games comprise speech-acts that, in the parlance of 
Wittgenstein’s follower John Austin, accomplish illocutionary (social action-oriented) 
aims and have perlocutionary (behavior-modifying) effects. Such games, in turn, 
circumscribe rule-governed “ways of life” that are inherently public and shared.    
As developed by Peter Winch in his pioneering manifesto The Idea of Social 
Science (1958), the implication of this Wittgensteinian theory of meaning for explaining 
human action was nothing less than momentous, in that it reaffirmed the dualism between 
natural and human science that formerly had been defended by neo-Kantians. According 
to Winch, meaningful action is distinguished from brute behavior in being essentially 
structured and identified by the intentions of the actor. Such intentions are therefore not 
discrete psychic causes that precede physical action as Popper, Hempel, and other 
advocates of the so-called “covering law” model of social and historical explanation had 
maintained. On the contrary, intentional actions cannot be causally explained with 
reference to social laws but can only be understood and interpreted within the context of 
a rule-governed language game, or way of life. More precisely, the intentions of the actor 
– what it is he or she intends to do by his or her action – implicitly refers to norms of 
speaking and acting. To explain an action is therefore to understand it as a meaningful 
instance of a norm that could, in principle, be creatively applied or even violated. 
The Wittgensteinian revolution in philosophy of language proved pivotal for the 
development of later critical theory. It enabled the most notable exponents of this theory, 
Karl-Otto Apel and Habermas, to recover the lost insights of the pragmatist tradition, 
above all Peirce’s operationalist  theory of meaning and Mead’s social behaviorist 
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account of  mind, in the sixties and seventies – well in advance of the renaissance of 
Anglo-American neo-pragmatism.24 This appropriation of classical pragmatism has 
continued apace under third-generation critical theorists, Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, 
whose use of Dewey and, above all, Mead, to develop new theories of recognition and 
democracy has taken critical theory more deeply into the heart of social progressivism.25 
  In the hands of Habermas and Apel, pragmatism was used to construct a 
transcendental theory of knowledge-constitutive interests as an alternative to positivist 
“objectivism.”  Following Habermas’s  formulation of this new program of critical 
pragmatism, different interests that have emerged in the course of the natural history of 
the human species determine distinctive frameworks of action and knowledge. 
Corresponding to a technical interest in controlling nature-like processes is instrumental 
action – articulated in experimental methods – that serves to stabilize successful beliefs 
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 Apel’s epochal introduction of American pragmatism (principally Peircian semiotics) 
to the German public appeared in his two volume study The Transformation of 
Philosophy (1973), which also displays a great debt to the neo-Kantian tradition of 
Dilthey and the post-positivist philosophy of the late Wittgenstein. Habermas’s 
indebtedness to Peirce is evident in his earlier work, Knowledge and Human 
Interests (1968), while his use of Mead later appears in the second volume of his 
Theory of Communicative Action (1981).   
25
 For discussions of these developments in the second and third generations of critical 
theorists, see respectively the essays by James Swindal in History of Continental 
Philosophy. Volume 6, ed. Schrift, and Amy Allen in History of Continental 
Philosophy. Volume 7, ed. Braidotti. 
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about cause and effect. Corresponding to a practical interest in understanding ourselves 
and (reaching) understanding (with) others is communicative action – articulated in 
historical interpretative methods – that serves to stabilize right beliefs about identities, 
norms, values, and ends. Corresponding to an emancipatory interest is critical reflection – 
articulated in psychotherapeutic methods combining causal explanation and holistic 
understanding – that serves to expose distortions in self-understanding caused by the 
effects of domination.   
Since the late seventies, Habermas’s critical theory has evolved into a full-blown 
theory of communicative action whose debt to pragmatism – especially to Mead and 
Wittgenstein – is evident in the name he gives his philosophy of language: universal 
pragmatics.  If anything, the newer generation of critical theorists has sought to wrest the 
materialist spirit of pragmatism even further from the Kantian dualisms that still define 
Habermas’s theory. Needless to say, all of this testifies to the continuing impact of 
pragmatism on the future of German critical philosophy.    
